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THOMSON'S PRELIMINARIES ABOUT
CAUSATION AND RIGHTS
MICHAEL S. MOORE*

As the title of Judith Thomson's article indicates, her essay consists
of some brush-clearing preliminaries to the topic that centrally interests
her, the relation between causing harm to another and violation of another's rights. Before getting to those preliminaries, it is important that
we clarify what the subject is to which these topics are preliminary.
The thesis that centrally interests Thomson is what I shall call the
moral strict responsibility thesis (MSRT). According to MSRT, an actor
infringes the rights of another whenever he, by his action, causes harm to
the other. This thesis is not so bereft of friends as Thomson's opening
sentence would indicate.' For example, those who urge that tort law
exists to correct an injustice between two parties quite regularly espouse
or presuppose some version of this thesis. Richard Epstein is one prominent example, 2 but others include: those judges who recognize private
necessity as only a "qualified" defense in tort law--qualified in the sense
that if one causes harm to another's person or property in order to save
one's own person or property, one is faultless but still must pay for the
harm one caused because he violated the injured person's rights; 3 those
judges who recognize a good samaritan duty for one who has innocently
caused another to be in a condition of peril, where absent such causation
*
Robert Kingsley Professor of Law, University of Southern California; Professor of Law,
University of California, Berkeley. With thanks to Catharine Hantzis, Heidi Hurd, Leo Katz, Mark
Kelman, Ken Kress, Brian Loar, and the participants at the USC Law Faculty Workshop, for their
helpful comments.
1. "Nobody believes it follows from the fact that X did something, his doing of which caused
Y to suffer a harm, that X infringed a right of Y's." Thomson, Causality and Rights: Some Preliminaries, 63 CHi-KENT L. REV. 471, 471 (1987) (Professor Thomson's article appears in this
symposium issue.). I assume in what follows that Thomson will allow, as a recognizable version of
this thesis, that X causing a harm to Y will not only infringe a right of Y's, but that it will also
violate a duty of X's.
2. Richard Epstein wrote that:
[T]he first task of the law of torts is to define the boundaries of individual liberty. To this
question the rules of strict liability based upon the twin notions of cause and volition provide a better answer than the alternative theories based upon the notion of negligence,
whether explicated in moral or economic terms. In effect, the principles of strict liability
say that the liberty of one person ends when he causes harm to another. Until that point he

is free to act as he chooses ....

Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL. STUD. 151, 203-04 (1973).
3. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn, 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).
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one has no such duty; 4 those judges and scholars who occasionally and
inconsistently mouth the old maxim, "as between two innocent parties,
''5
let he who caused the harm pay for it.
Each of these legal doctrines is

a natural implication of MSRT, because each could reflect the judgment
that to cause harm is to violate rights and that violating rights is a wrong
for which the wrongdoer must pay.
Mark Kelman, certainly no friend of MSRT, nonetheless finds a version of the thesis to pervade that strand of liberal thought he broadly
labels "libertarian." Because libertarians are value skeptics, Kelman argues, they cannot find rights to be natural. Therefore, they "must derive
rights from a morally plausible general statement about what might constitute rights-violating behavior: prima facie, the obvious candidate is
that one ought not to cause harm (at least without justification). We are
all equally unentitled to cause harm ....

6

The MSRT is one that Thomson herself could use to support a more
traditional corrective justice theory of torts to which she may adhere, one
in which fault is as necessary to liability as is causation. 7 A friend of
MSRT might say that to cause harm is to violate moral and legal rights,
even though one is excused from both legal liability and moral culpability
8
if the causing was done without fault.

The thesis may have implications in other areas of law and morality
as well. Thomson illustrates this toward the end of her paper by her
4. See the discussion in Epstein, supra note 2, at 191-95.
5. See, e.g., Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts. An Economic Theory,
80 CoiUM. L. REzv. 1399, 1402-03 (1980): "Our position ... is that it is fairer, as a general rule, to
impose the burden of an injury on the party who causes it than on the party who suffers it." Since
Rizzo and Arnold also believe that -[behind every tort there must be ... violation of... a right."
Id. at 1407 n.45. In their case it is particularly clear that MSRT underlies their acceptance of the
common law maxim.
6. Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judgments in Liberal Political Theory,
63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 583 (1987) (Professor Kelman's article appears in this symposium issue.). We should be skeptical of Kelman's (and Critical Legal Studies' generally) assumption that
libertarians are value-skeptics.
7. See Thomson, Remarks on Causation and Liability, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101, 101 (1984),
wherein Thomson begins her discussion with a description of traditional tort law as involving three
elements in any plaintiff's case: harm of the plaintiff, fault of the defendant, and an act by defendant
causing plaintiff's harm. Between Epstein, Kelman, and Thomson one may glimpse three versions
of a moral strict responsibility thesis worth discussing: one whereby causing harm to another, even
if justified or excused, violates the other's rights (see, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2; Vincent, 109 Minn.
at 456, 124 N.W. at 221); one whereby causing harm to another, where the causing is unjustified,
violates that other's rights (Kelman's libertarian foe); one whereby unjustifiably causing harm to
another violates that other's rights only insofar as the act causing the harm was not excused (one
interpretation of traditional tort law requiring fault in addition to causation).
8. The hypothesized friend of MSRT is justified in saying this because excuses of a defendant,
unlike justifications, cannot plausibly be thought to be relevant to whether the defendant did a wrong
or whether in doing so he violated another's rights. Persons excused because of defective capacities
or diminished opportunities still violate the rights of those they hurt; they just do not do so culpably.
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discussion of "takings" cases. 9 In this context one might say that if causing harm is to violate rights, then state regulation or prohibition of such
harm-causing actions cannot be a taking of property for which compensation must be paid. Cedar-growers, for example, may be prohibited
from causing harm to apple-growers (via wind transmissible cedar rust)
because such actions are wrongs (rights violations) which no one has a
right to do.
Thomson herself is as unsympathetic as she is to MSRT, because, I
would guess, of the potential impact of the thesis on Thomson's own
preferred solution to some of the difficult questions of moral and legal
justification. Thomson has elsewhere argued that it is permissible to kill
one to save five only when the means of using the one to save the five do
not violate the one's important rights.' 0 We may redirect a run-away
trolley onto one person in order to save five because redirecting the trolley onto another track does not, by itself, violate anyone's rights; we may
not bump the fat fellow standing next to us into the path of the oncoming
trolley in order to stop it from hitting five because such bumping, by
itself, violates the fat person's rights. If MSRT were right, then the
rights of the proposed single victim would in each case be violated by the
acts causing him harm; and Thomson would have to alter the basis of her
distinction from rights to something else.
So Thomson is no friend of MSRT. The present paper is not a frontal assault on that thesis, however, but some preliminary skirmishing.
The preliminaries to MSRT that Thomson examines all have to do with
one problem for the thesis. This is the problem of whether causation is a
sufficiently discriminating relation that it can limit causal candidates for
any given harm only to those that are plausibly rights-violations. Thomson's story, BRICK, illustrates the problem. In BRICK, B is hit by a
brick thrown by A, who was trying to hit B but "missed;" he hit C,
whose body deflected the brick onto B, thereby causing B to lose his eye.
If C's walking toward the bus stop, and B's sitting on the bench, are as
much causes of B's loss of his eye as A's act of throwing the brick, then
causation does not sufficiently discriminate; for no one (including Thomson), wants to say that C or B violated B's rights by their respective
activities. To be plausible, MSRT must discriminate between those who
are injurers and those who are either victims or innocent bystanders.
Thomson's BRICK example seems to suggest that causation is not so
9. Thomson, supra note 1, at 486.
10. Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YAILE L.J. 1395, 1403-12 (1985).
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discriminating. "
In the body of her paper Thomson quickly discards three theses
about causation that would allow it to do the discriminating work demanded of it by MSRT, and then examines in greater depth a fourth
thesis. The three quick discards are:
2
(1) The thesis that for any given harm there is only one cause;'
(2) The thesis that for any given harm there is only one activity that is
the cause; 13

(3) The thesis that for any given harm there is only one human action
or natural event that we will say was "the cause," namely, those
acts that are fully voluntary or those natural events sufficiently abnormal that their occurrence with the harm amounts to a
coincidence. 14
Surely Thomson is right in rejecting (1) and (2). There is no remotely plausible concept of cause under which one could say either of
these things. However, I tend to think that Thomson's explanation for
why we use the locution, "the cause,"' 5 is less successful. I think we
mean what we say when we use "the cause;" that the criteria that guide
our selection for the application of this honorific phrase are not arbitrary
or nonexistent; but that such criteria are pragmatic constraints on utterance of the phrase in particular contexts, not semantic criteria having
anything to do with what "cause" means or with what the relation of
causation is.
Thomson I suspect would agree with the very last of these comments. I infer this because she clearly rejects the relevance (to MSRT) of
affirming or denying the third thesis. She explicitly puts aside the well
known thesis of Hart and Honor6 t6 (which thesis had to do with causal
selection being based on voluntary human actions or abnormal natural
events amounting to a coincidence) as "pragmatic" and not "ontological." ' 7 In this rejection of merely pragmatic theses about what we will
11. I ignore in the text a statement in Thomson's paper that puzzles me. She says: "Unlike C,
B is not an exception to the thesis that if X did something, his doing of which caused Y a harm, then
X infringed a right of Y's. For even given that B's sitting down at the bus-stop caused the loss of an
eye, the eye lost was B's own." Thomson, supra note 1, at 485. That the eye lost was B's own seems
to me to be a very good reason to deny that B violated B's rights. But then why does a friend of
MSRT not need a notion of causation sufficiently discriminating that it excludes B's sitting as a
cause? If B's sitting is a cause, B is as much a counter example to MSRT as is C-unless one adds to
MSRT the ad hoc stipulation that for all X and all Y to which the thesis applies, X cannot be
identical to Y.
12. Id. at 476-78, 487.
13. Id. at 487-88.
14. Id. at 477-78.
15. Id.
16. H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
17. Thomson, supra note 1, at 472-73.

THOMSON'S PRELIMINARIES

say, Thomson reveals a metaphysical realism about causation that I
share. Such realism distinguishes what people say when they use "cause"
and even the concept they implicitly employ when they talk of causation,
from what the causal relation really is.18
Because such realism colors much of Thomson's argumentation
throughout her essay, and because it is only implicit, it is worth making
this presupposition explicit. Thomson at various points argues: (1) "the
question whether one event X causes another event Y can hardly be
thought to turn on anyone's moral failings,"1 9 and, more broadly, "What
has morality to do with the question whether one thing caused another?"; 20 (2) the question of motivation or intention of the actor "surely
cannot be thought to fix" the question of causation; 2 1 (3) the question of
legal duty to act cannot be relevant to the question of whether a causal
relation can exist from a mere omission to act; 22 (4) "What have X's
capacities to do with the question whether X's not doing something
caused something else?"; 2 3 and (5), most importantly, "what is customary, and what is expected, do not affect the truth-values of causal claims.
*

.

. [and therefore] it is hard to see how any counterfactual analysis of

causality can be right."' 24 These points are as obvious as they are to
Thomson only because "cause" for her names a real relation that is not
the same as things like morality, legal duty, or the intentions, capacities,
or conventions of persons.
I do not bring Thomson's metaphysical presupposition into the foreground in order to criticize it. Quite the contrary. It is worth identifying
in order to highlight the contrast between Thomson's realism and the
anti-realism about causation of the Legal Realist tradition in American
legal scholarship, and of the two skeptical traditions Legal Realism has
spawned, the Law and Economics movement and Critical Legal Studies. 2 5 Consider Mark Kelman's contribution to this volume by way of
18. An example of clear-headed realism about causation is J.L. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE
at ix (1980).
19. Thomson, supra note 1, at 471-72.
20. Id. at 495.
21. Id. at 485.
22. Id. at 495.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 484.
25. The skepticism about causation is most evident in Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In Fact.
9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956), although much of the early skepticism about the meaningfulness of the
concept of proximate causation also infected causation itself. See Edgerton, Legal Cause. 72 U. PA.
L. RiFv. 211. 243 (1924); Green, Arc, There Dependable Rudes of Causation?,77 U. PA. L. R .v. 601.
604-06 (1929).
The influence of Malone, Edgerton, and Green is quite evident in the law and economics literature on causation. Thus, Guido Calabresi concludes to his satisfaction that "in the law 'cause in fact'
UNIVERSE
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illustration of the latter tradition. 26 Kelman claims we must "wake up"
from the nightmare of liberal tort law because it is based on a notion of
causation that is incoherent and unknowable. 2 7 Many of Kelman's more
particular arguments for the incoherence of any concept of causation presuppose a very conventionalist view of the world. Specifically, Kelman
presupposes (and at times asserts) that: (1) no one, including Thomson,
can define causation; 28 (2) in any event, even if someone could define it,
she could not get agreement by others that her definition is what "cause"
means; 29 and (3) her definition in any event would have an unprincipled
and unjustified distinction built into its application to concrete cases, viz,
that internal evidence overrules external evidence even when the latter,
' 30
judged probabilistically, is the "better evidence."
Thomson's metaphysical realism is surely secure against assumptions like these. For notice that they in turn presuppose, respectively:
(1) that you must be able to define a word if that word is to have meaning;3' (2) that most language users in the relevant linguistic community
must agree on that definition if the word is to have meaning for that
. . . is in the end a functional concept designed to achieve human goals." Calabresi, Concerning
Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 107 (1975).
There, he reached this conclusion on just the grounds Malone used in reaching a like conclusion.
See id. at 105-06. Similarly skeptical of causation are Landes & Posner, Causation in Tort Law.- An
Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983). Landes & Posner, in their rush to replace
causation with probability theory, feel entitled to deride the philosophical attempt to define causation as "fruitless," totally context-dependent in its meaning, and in any event irrelevant to the purposes for which tort law should use the concept. Id. at 109-11, 119. Steve Shavell explicitly adopts
Edgerton's and Calabresi's "instrumentalist" approach to causation, defining the concept so as to
serve "well-specified social goals." Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the
Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 502 (1980). Shavell recognizes that there exists a commonsense notion of cause that antedates the law, but in such a common-sense concept, "questions about
causation are to an important extent resolved by resort to intuitions about the justness of applying a
rule of liability." Id.
Calabresi, Landes and Posner, and Shavell are not fully aware of how truly skeptical they are
about causation, because often they seek to rescue the concept by giving it a probabilistic definition.
If they clearly saw the difference between ex ante probability theory, which deals with types of acts,
and ex post causation theory, which deals with particular actions ("act-tokens"), they would see that
they are not in any sense analyzing causation but are replacing it with something else. On this, see
Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 435 (1985).
26. Kelman, supra note 6.
27. Id. at 637.
28. Id. at 581.
29. Id. at 587.
30. Id. at 592-93.
31. Think of all the words that we seem to use meaningfully that no one can define: The
natural kind terms of ordinary speech, such as "gold," "lemon," or "water"; nominal kind words
such as "game," for which only Wittgenstein's criteriological analysis can be given; dispositional
terms such as "greedy" or "soluble;" theoretical terms such as "kinetic energy" or "force;" and
terms typically used in evaluative speech acts, such as "good" or "right." See Moore, The Semantics
of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 202-46 (1981). Kelman is as naive as Socrates in his insistence
that we must be able to define whatever we claim to know. The insight garnered by a less psycholog-
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community;3 2 and (3) that the evidence with which one verifies the appli-

33
cation of a word to the world is determinative of that word's meaning.
Since anyone familiar with the developments in semantics of the last two
34
decades will pretty much reject these presuppositions out of hand, I
think that we can pretty much put aside Kelman's anti-realism about
causation. In addition, these conventionalist presuppositions to Kelman's more particular arguments assume a general anti-realist stance
about the things (like causation) to which our words refer.
Not sharing this question-begging character are Kelman's specific
35
I
arguments against any necessary condition analysis of causation.

shall mention one of these three arguments, which leads to an intermediate conclusion (about the necessary condition analysis of causation, not
causation itself) that Thomson, too, wishes to defend.
Consider the example of Hart and Honor6 36 on which Kelman
builds: 37 A fire that burns down a house appears to have two necessary
conditions, D, having started a fire near the house and D 2 pouring gasoline on that fire. (The second is necessary because DI's fire was about to
go out when D 2 threw on the gasoline.) According to Kelman, we might
describe D 2's act either as "pouring gas" or as "doing whatever is needed
to burn [down the house]." ' 38 Because under the first description D 2's act
ical view of meaning is that we may mean a great deal more than we know when we say, -X causes
Y."1

32. Why should we need agreement about what "cause" means for it to have meaning? More
plausibly, one should view linguistic communities as employing what Putnam calls a "'division of
linguistic labor"

(PUTNAM, The Meaning of "Meaning," in MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY 215

(1975)), such that most in a community can rely on others to fill in the theory that makes sense of
the words they employ.
33. Even if Kelman were right in his criticism of Thomson's earlier distinction between the two
kinds of evidence with which we verify causal statements, only a verificationist about meaning would
think that this irrationality in our methods of verification infects the meaning of those statements.
For Thomson's distinction, see Thomson, supra note 7; see also Thomson, Liability and Individualized Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (Summer 1986). It is thus not Thomson who is
"confusing a reasonable practical rule of thumb [favoring one kind of evidence over another] with a
principled definition." Kelman, supra note 6, at 593. Rather, it is Kelman who confuses practical
rules of verification with meaning.
34. See, e.g., supra notes 31-33.
35. Kelman argues against the necessary condition analysis of causation, that:
(I) no action has only a single description that correctly picks it out, yet the truth of the
causal judgment, -X caused Y," depends on how we describe X, and there is no principled
way to pick one description of X over another, Kelman, supra note 6, at 604-06;
(2) there is a "subset problem" in how we aggregate parts of events into whole events when
we use events as causes, id. at 603-04;
(3) there are some cases where we cannot know whether a causal relation exists but where
we pretend to greater evidence than we possess, id. at 606-08.
36.

H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORI", CAUSATION IN THE LAW 69 (1st ed. 1959).

37. Kelman, supra note 6, at 605.
38. Id.
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was necessary, but under the second it is not, 39 and because we have no
"strong conventions" allowing us to prefer one description to the other,40
we are left with no answer to the question of whether D 2's act was a
necessary condition of the harm.
Notice that Kelman's example, if analyzed his way, might force us
to the view that causal contexts are not extensional. For if the substitutivity salva veritate of co-referring expressions holds true here, 4' then
D 2's act should be a necessary condition regardless of which description
of it is chosen.
What Kelman overlooks is the move to preserve the extensionality
of causal contexts made by the very literature he is attacking. For
Wright, 42 and behind him Mackie, 43 have anticipated Kelman's problem
in the following way. If "pouring gas" and "doing whatever is needed to
burn down the house" refer to the identical act-token, then it is just not
true that different descriptions of that act-token yield different truth-values when plugged into the expression, "x causes y."44 Temptations to
say that these descriptions make a difference come only from other construals of the reference of these descriptions. One possibility is that these
act descriptions refer to types of acts, abstract universals, not particular
events. Such descriptions, so construed, do not refer to the same acttypes, and, because of this, no violation of extensionality need take place
in order to say, with Kelman, that how you describe the act (types) matters. But the problem with this construal is that "ex post causation"
(Kelman's language for causation itself) is a relation between act-tokens,
not act-types. For Kelman to take his descriptions to refer only to acttypes and not to particular actions is to presuppose the skeptical conclu39. Id. at 606-07.
40. Id.
41. The doctrine of substitutivity salva veritate holds that if two expressions X and Y refer to
the same thing, then anything that can be predicated of X can be predicated of Y without changing
the truth values of the overall expressions in which they occur, and vice versa. For the classic
treatment of the "principle of substitutivity salva veritate" and extensionality versus intensionality
generally, see W.V. QUINE, WORD AND OBJEcT (1960); QUINE, Reference and Modality, in FRONM A
LoGICAl. POINT OF VIEW 139 (2d ed. 1961); and QUINE, Quantifiers and PropositionalAttitudes. in
THE WAYS Ol PARADOX 183 (1966). See also REFERENCE AND MODALITY (L. Linsky ed. 1971):
and WORDS AND OBJECTIONS, ESSAYS ON THE WORKS OF W.V.QUINE (D. Davidson & J. Hintikka
eds. 1969). The extensionality of causal contexts is more specifically discussed in Anscombe, Causality and Extensionality, 66 J. PHIL. 152 (1969): Davidson. Causal Relations. 64 J. PHIL. 691 (1967):
Follesdal, Quantification into Causal Contexts, in REFERENCE AND MODAIrY, supra: Vendler.
Causal Relations, 64 J. PHIL. 704 (1967). See also Achinstein. The Causal Relation. 4 MIDwsrT
STUD. PHIl.. 369 (1979); Lombard, The ExtensionalityofCausalContexts: A Comment.4 MIDWEST
STUD. PHIL. 409 (1979); and Rosenberg & Martin, The Extensionality of Causal Contexts. 4 MIDWEST STui. PHIl. 401 (1979).

42. Wright. Causation in Tort Law. 73 CAI II. L. REV. 1735. 1766-74 (1985).
43. J.L. MACKIE, supra note 18. at 258-69.
44. See id. at 257.
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sion for which he is arguing, namely, that there is no such thing as
5
causation.

4

The real temptation to think that descriptions matter stems from a
third construal of those descriptions' reference. Both Mackie 46 and
Wright 47 wish to countenance the possibility that such descriptions do
not refer to acts at all, either types or tokens, but to properties of acttokens. So taken, these descriptions refer to different properties, one of
which is causally relevant (pouring) and the other of which is not (doing
the act with the motive of burning down the house). On this third construal of the reference of these descriptions, extensionality is preserved
(at least in higher order logics), despite the fact that the differing descriptions matter, because they are descriptions of different properties; yet,
contrary to Kelman, these not being descriptions of the same property,
there is no arbitrariness in our causal ascriptions (because of a supposed
arbitrariness in our description selection). Quite the contrary: there is a
determinate (objective) answer to what properties are causally relevant to
particular harms, as both Mackie and Wright conclude, so that what description one chooses is determined by what property is causally relevant. In Kelman's example, that the act-token possessed the property,
being a pouring of gasoline, is causally relevant, and that it possessed the
property of being motivated by a certain desire is not (there would have
been that burning no matter what desire prompted the act of pouring the
gasoline). Unless Kelman wishes to claim that properties cannot be
causes, which he nowhere does, Wright and Mackie seem secure from
any challenge based on alleged failures of extensionality in causal
contexts.
Thus, Kelman does not get his desired conclusion under any of the
three interpretations of the reference of his descriptions that come to
mind. We should turn, then, to Thomson's argument, 4 which leads to
the conclusion sought by Kelman, viz, that the necessary condition anal45. Cf S. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 66-68 (1982),
wherein Kripke rightly labels any limitation of causal candidates to types of acts, not particular acts.
as "a sceptical [sic] solution" to Hume's problem about causation. Kelman. like the Legal Realists
and the lawyer-economists, can of course follow Humean skepticism about causation. What he may
not do is presuppose that skepticism in an argument designed to establish it.
46. J.L. MACKIE, supra note 18, at 257-62.
47. Wright, supra note 42, at 1766-74. This is not an endorsement of the Mackie-Wright thesis
that properties of event-tokens can be causes, although one cannot answer them except by doing just
the metaphysics that Kelman eschews. If I were to attack the thesis, it would be on the grounds that
properties are used only in building the kind of causal generalizations that figure in causal explanations, and that although such generalizations give good grounds for inferring singular causal relations, the properties referred to in such generalizations are not themselves causes. Only the eventtokens that possess such propertites are causes.
48. Thomson, supra note I, at 481-84.

506

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

ysis, even when sophisticated a la Mackie and Wright, cannot be an adequate analysis of causation.
Contrary to Kelman, Thomson assumes "cause" names a real relation, and then finds the necessary condition analysis of it wanting for its
inability to preserve this realism. More exactly, put in the form of a
reductio Thomson's argument is:
(1) x is a cause of y if and only if x is a necessary condition of y (the
necessary condition analysis of "cause");
(2) x is a necessary condition of y if and only if, if x did not occur, y
would not occur (the counterfactual analysis of necessity);
(3) if x did not occur, y would not occur if and only if, "if x did not
occur, y would not occur" has a truth value (a weak version
of
49
Tarski's disquotational device allowing semantic ascent);
(4) "if x did not occur, y would not occur" has a truth value if and
only if some choice is made with respect to all features of the situation surrounding x, distinguishing those that are varied (along with
the absence of x) from those that are held fixed as part of the background (the element of choice in imagining
the possible world in
50
which the counterfactual is to be tested);
(5) if a choice is made with respect to all features of the situation,
distinguishing those that are varied (along with the absence of x)
from those that are held fixed as part of the background, then there
is a convention or expectation guiding the choice of possible
worlds in which the causal statement is tested. 5 '
Therefore from (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5):
(6) x is the cause of y only if there is a convention or expectation that
guides the choice of possible worlds in which the causal statement
is tested.
But (6) is inconsistent with Thomson's realism about causation:
(7) "[w]hat is customary, and what is expected, do not affect the truth52
values of causal claims."
Therefore, since Thomson firmly holds to realism about causation (7),
she must reject (6); yet since she accepts (2), (3), (4) and (5), to reject (6)
she must reject (1), the necessary condition analysis of causation. Indeed, given her argument, Thomson must reject not only the necessary
condition analysis of causation, but also any counterfactual conditional
analysis of causation, Mackie's and Wright's included, an implication she
explicitly recognizes. 53 Unlike Kelman, for Thomson this does not mean
49.
devices
50.
51.
52.
53.

For a good, brief discussion of using Tarski-like truth sentences simply as "disquotational"
allowing semantic ascent, see M. DEvIr, REALISM AND TRUTH 28-31 (1984).
Thomson, supra note 1,at 483.
Id. at 483-84.
Id. at 484.
Id.
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that we should give up on our concept of causation; only that we should
abandon any counterfactual analysis of it.
Before assessing this argument of Thomson's, we should see where it
fits in to the overall argument structure of her article. Recall that she
seeks some discriminating notion of cause that will distinguish injurers
from both sufferers and innocent bystanders; such a discriminating idea
of cause allows one, in turn, to maintain that to cause harm to another is
to violate that other's rights (which injurers do, but sufferers and bystanders do not).
Having summarily rejected three theses that would provide such a
discriminating idea of cause, Thomson examines a fourth in the body of
her article. This is a thesis about the domain over which the variable x
can range in the two place predicate, "x causes y." The thesis is that the
proper domain of x is event-tokens (including act-tokens), but not states.
Such a thesis would allow one to exclude such states as C being at the
bus-stop at the time A throws the brick in Thomson's BRICK scenario,
and arguably even excludes those events that cause harm only by causing
states that cause harm, such as C's earlier walking toward the bus-stop as
54

well.

After knocking down various arguments in favor of the thesis, 55
Thomson searches for a positive argument for the opposite thesis that
states can be causes. One such positive argument would be that "x
causes y" means "x is a necessary condition for y." For if "cause" is
analyzed in terms of necessary conditions, states as well as events can be
necessary conditions and thus causes. 56 Because of the reductio argument
54. The "'arguably" is in the text because one would have to think that if the state of C being at
the bus-stop at the relevant time cannot be a cause of B's harm, then neither can any event (such as C
walking to the bus-stop) that caused that state be a cause of the harm. Thomson, supra note I, at
476, seeks to explain this view: "since the causal role played by C's walking towards the bus-stop
was exhausted by its having caused C's being at P at T ...C's walking towards the bus-stop did not
cause the loss of B's eye ...but only caused a condition in which A's throwing the brick was able to,
and did, cause the loss of B's eye." For defenses of just this sort of intuition (of the causal potency of
events being exhausted by the creation of once-but-no-longer dangerous states), see Beale, The Proxi-

mate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633, 651-52 (1920); Beale, Recovery for Consequences of an Act, 9 HARV. L. REV. 80, 84-5 (1895); and Epstein, supra note 2, at 185. The Beale/
Epstein intuition is close to that dealt with by Thomson, for both think that causation is largely a
matter of events, or "active forces." E.g., Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, supra, at
641: "nothing but an active force can bring about that change of conditions which we call a consequence." They allow states to be causes only insofar as they are unstable, and even then they might
say that it is the release of stored energy (an event) that is the cause, not the state of its storage. And
for both Epstein and Beale, once a defendant's action (an event) has caused a state that is "stable"
(Beale) or "not in danger of releasing or redirecting forces" (Epstein), the causation by the defendant's action has, as Beale put it, " 'exhausted itself' like a spent cartridge." Beale, Recovery for
Consequences of an Act, supra, at 85.
55. Thomson, supra note 1,at 476-80.
56. Id. at 481.
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just sketched, however, Thomson rejects this (and every other)
counterfactual analysis of causation. 57 We now need to examine this argument of Thomson's.
If I were a friend of the counterfactual analysis of causation (my
own hesitation here, because I am at present an educable agnostic on this
issue), I would attack premises (4) and (5) in Thomson's argument. For
I too endorse realism about causation (7), which leads me to reject the
conventionalism explicit in (6). Further, since a counterfactual analysis
of necessity seems right (2), and since one can hardly question (3), if one
is not to reject the necessary condition analysis of causation (1), that
leaves (4) and (5) as the suspect premises.
Before coming to the grounds on which one might suspect (4) and
(5) to be false, we should see why these premises are at least plausible. I
would describe their plausibility in the following way. 58 When we say,
contrary to fact, that "but for x, y would not have occurred," there is a
lot that we have left unsaid. Two items we have not mentioned are, first,
what are we to imagine happened in place of x? If the statement in question is, "if Smith had not set foot on the steps, the rotten beams under
them would not have collapsed,"'5 9 what replaces "Smith setting foot on
the steps" to test the truth of this counterfactual? If we replace it with
"Smith using a different stairway," the counterfactual may well be true;
if we replace it with, "Smith bounding up the steps at just the time he
actually walked up the steps," it may seem to be false. Second, even once
we choose, say, "Smith using a different stairway" as the replacement,
how many other things in the world are we to imagine having also
changed along with Smith's change of entrance? For example, what had
to change for Smith to have used a different entrance? Perhaps Jones,
who is Smith's chauffeur and who is heavier than Smith, dropped Smith
off at the safe entrance only to run Smith's forgotten briefcase up the
rotten one. If this is what we vary, then the counterfactual may seem to
be false; other events, neutral to weight equal to or greater than Smith's
being on the stairs at the relevant time, would leave the counterfactual
true.
57. Id. at 481-84.
58.

See generally N. GOODMAN,

FACT, FICTION

AND FORECAST

9-17 (4th ed.

1983);

Chisholm, Law Statements and CounterfactualInference, 15 ANALYSIS 97 (1955); Rescher, BeliefContravening Suppositions, 60 PHIL. REV. 176 (1961); Stalnaker, A Theory of Conditionals, in STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY 165 (N. Rescher ed. 1968), for discussions of the problem of indeterminacy

for counterfactual conditionals. The latter three essays are also collected in CAUSATION AND CONDITIONALS at 147, 156, 165 (E. Sosa ed. 1975), which contains a discussion of the problem in its
Introduction. CAUSATION AND CONDITIONALS, supra, at 12-14.
59. See Thomson, supra note 1, at 483.
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On both of these bases one might find plausible the idea that the
truth of a counterfactual depends on what we hold fixed and on what we
vary, thus, (4). Further, one might think, with Thomson, that what we
do fix or vary is a matter guided solely by convention and not by any
limitations imposed by the nature of the causal relation. One convention
we likely follow is: "hold fixed normal features of the situation." Following such a convention, we would thus hold fixed Smith's weight
(which Thomson allows "is not especially heavy") and thus not ask any
counterfactual question where what replaces the real Smith stepping on
the stairs is a lighter or a heavier Smith doing So. 6 0 Likewise, the variations on walking (jumping, bounding, treading, etc.) would also be ruled
out on similar grounds. Hence, the plausibility of (5).
Despite this plausibility, my friend of the necessity analysis of causation would reject (4) and (5). One ground for rejecting (4) would be that
advanced by David Lewis, amongst others.6 1 According to Lewis, when
testing the counterfactual, "If C had not occurred, E would not have
occurred," we test it in that possible world that is closest to our actual
world. That is, when we suppose, contrary to fact, that C did not occur,
we further suppose changes from our actual world only to the minimum
extent necessary to make it true (in this closest possible world) that C did
62
not occur.
Attractive as this view is, it would require (as Lewis recognizes) that
we make sense of the idea of over-all similarity, i.e., similarity that is
parasitic on no particular properties but only on all properties. As I have
argued in the context of precedent and induction, 63 this is not a very
plausible idea of similarity. Lewis sees the problem as one of vagueness
(about similarity), but it is much deeper than that. Thinking that we can
have a context-independent idea of similarity is like thinking that we can
60. John Mackie, for example, finds that common-sense views of causality employ an "all-ornothing" convention in considering what is to replace matters susceptible of continuous variation
such as weight. In discussing whether a hammer-blow is necessary for the crushing of a chestnut,
Mackie holds that "we regard the hammer-blow as a unit, and simply do not consider parts or
subdivisions of it or quantitative alterations to it. The alternatives considered are that I strike the
chestnut in the way described and that I do not. In constructing possible worlds, in considering
what might or would have happened, we either plug in the hammer-blow as a whole or leave it out as
a whole." J.L. MACKIE, supra note 18, at 44.
61. See, e.g., Lewis, Causation, 70 J. PHU. 556 (1973). See generally D. LEwis, COUNTERFACTUAI.S (1973), and Michael Loux's introduction in THE POSSIBLE AND THE ACTUAL 32-34 (M.
Loux ed. 1979).
62. Lewis, supra note 61, at 263.
63. Moore, Precedent. Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 000 (L.
Goldstein ed. 1987). For somewhat similar doubts, see H. PUTNAM, REALISM AND REASON 218
(1983).
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have a context-independent sense to "attributive" 64 adjectives such as
"big." How big something has to be to be "big" depends on what kind of
thing we are talking about. Similarly, "similar" depends on its context of
utterance to specify what property on which it is parasitic. And with this
context-dependent notion of similarity, we are back where we started in
seeking some basis for varying some properties, but not others, as we
construct a possible world that is "most similar" to our actual world.
My own doubts about (4) are based on two different considerations.
First, we need to be clear that the variables x and y in (4) range over
event-tokens, not over event-types. It is true that if we take the reference
of "x" and "y" in "if x did not occur, y would not occur," to be types of
acts and types of harms, then there are the two problems of incompleteness mentioned (what replaces x, and how much else that was true
changes). This is so because, for example, when we imagine Smith's
heavier chauffeur stepping on the stairs at just the time Smith actually
stepped on the stairs, the same type of event would have occurred-a
collapse of the stairs. Yet causation is not a relation between event-types;
it is a relation between event-tokens. Therefore "x" and "y" in those
counterfactuals that are given as an analysis of causation should not be
65
taken to refer to types, but to tokens.
If we do take "x" and "y" to range over event-tokens, our second
consideration is how to individuate event-tokens. If we employ a very
fine-grained mode of individuating event-tokens, we do not get a dependence of the truth value of the counterfactual on how we complete the
specification of the contrary-to-fact ("possible") world. If Smith walking
up the steps did cause the collapse of the stairs, then it is true: no matter
how else the possible world is specified, 66 if Smith had not walked just as
64. For a discussion of attributive adjectives, see Geach, Good and Evil, 17 ANALYSIS 33
(1956).
65. The importance of getting the "ontology of causation" right has been emphasized by Davidson, supra note 41, J.L. MACKIE, supra note 18, at ch. 10; and, in a criticism of Mackie's earlier
efforts, Kim, Causes and Events: Mackie on Causation, 68 J. PHIL. 426 (1971), reprinted in CAUSATION AND CONDITIONALS 48 (E. Sosa ed. 1975). Yet because the problem of counterfactual conditionals has typically come up in the philosophy of science in the context of distinguishing laws from
accidental generalizations (in each of which one refers to types of events), this attention to ontology
often gets overlooked when counterfactual conditionals are being used in our analysis of singular
causal statements. One who does not overlook it in this context is Lewis, supra note 61, at 562 n.9.
66. I assume that we do not allow variance of the laws that bear on Smith's walking up the
steps being a cause of their collapse. If those laws were allowed to vary, then it might very well be
the case that the very same collapse of the stairs would take place even in the absence of Smith
stepping on them as he did. We might even think, following Popper, that we should exclude variance of any laws of science when we test the truth of a causation-generated counterfactual against all
possible worlds. K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 426-41 (1 1th ed. 1983). Then
all that we may vary are the "initial conditions" in which Smith's stepping took place, not any laws
(including those governing that stepping). One of the benefits of excluding variance of any laws as
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he did, the stairs would not have collapsed just as they did. More specifically, returning to each of qur two problems of incompleteness: first, it
does not matter if Smith bounded (rather than walked) up the stairs,
hitting just the same stair at the same time; although the stairs would still
collapse (let us suppose), there would not be the same collapse that there
actually was. In this example, the two collapses-the actual one, and the
one that would have happened if Smith had bounded up the stairs-are
not plausibly supposed to -be qualitatively identical. For the heavier
bounding would likely produce a slightly more rapid, deeper, or less
time-consuming collapse. 67 Second, it does not matter if Smith's heavier
chauffeur were to walk up the stairs just after Smith did-again, a different collapse of the stairs. The counterfactual, "but for x, y would not
have occurred" seems to remain true no matter how the possible world
imagined is completed in its particulars. Thus (4) seems to be false in its
assertion that counterfactual statements have truth values only when
choices are made about fixed versus variable features of the actual world.
And if (4) is false, then (5) has no interest for us in this context.
Thomson's rejection of any counterfactual analysis of causation thus
remains problematic. 6 8 In the context of her article, this need trouble her
we construct possible worlds is that it allows a crisp distinction between logical necessity (true
through all possible worlds) and causal necessity (true through all possible worlds in which the laws
of this world hold true). For development and criticism of this view, see J.L. MACKIE, supra note
18, at 209-30, and Lewis, supra note 61, at 566-67.
67. t assume that the two event-tokens are numerically distinct if they differ in properties other
than certain relational properties (the relational properties excluded have to include the property,
being-caused-by-Smith's walking, else the counterfactual analysis of causation becomes trivially
true). That a difference in properties does not automatically betoken a non-identity between the
entities possessing such properties, is due to the difficulties we have in making transworld identity
claims, because such difficulties force us to do something with Leibniz's otherwise true claim that
identicals are indiscernable in their properties. See THE POSSIBLE AND THE ACTUAL (M. Loux ed.
1979) for a variety of approaches to this problem. I also leave aside the difficult question of whether,
supposing the two collapses to be qualitatively identical in all respects, save being caused by Smith's
walking, they may yet be numerically. distinct. If one rejects Leibniz's other principle-the identity
of indiscernibles-one might still believe that the actual collapse that occurred and the collapses that
would have occurred in all possible worlds other than the actual one, are numerically distinct.
68. Although it is not clear that Thomson recognizes that she has made two distinct arguments
against the counterfactual analysis of causation, she has; and I in my text have dealt with only one of
them. I have ignored in the text Thomson's other argument for rejecting counterfactual analyses of
causation, the one she calls "the counterfactual second agent objection." Thomson, supra note 1, at
482. This objection builds on overdetermination examples of the pre-emptive kind: two fires, each
sufficient to burn plaintiff's house, are headed in its direction; the first fire (F), as luck would have it.
reaches the house first and burns it completely (if instantly) before the second fire (F,) gets there.
Thomson thinks that the counterfactual, "but for F, occurring, the house's burning would not have
occurred" is false even though F, is the cause of the house's burning. Ergo, the counterfactual (and,
mnutatis mutandis, its converse) is not an adequate analysis of causation.
The problem with all of the examples Thomson uses in this argument is the same as in her
argument discussed in the text: Thomson is either talking about event-types rather than eventtokens, or she has a course-grained theory of event-individuation over possible worlds. Only with
one of these assumptions is it plausible to say, with Thomson, and with H.L.A. HART & T. HONORS.
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little-it would only mean that she has one more argument that states as
well as events can be causes. Still, the issue is an important one for the
analysis of causation generally, and thus it has been worth following her
69
musings on the topic.

One of the curiosities of Thomson's article is that, although she tells
us what causation is not (it is not analyzed by counterfactuals), she never
tells us what the causal relation is. No small task, to be sure, but in the
absence of any analysis of "causes" in the expression, "x causes y," I see
no future in attempting to fix the domain over which the variables x and
y may range. Thomson's handicap here is like the handicap we would
face in specifying the domain of x and y in the expression "x loves y" if
we had no idea what the relation of love is.
Despite this handicap, Thomson concludes to her satisfaction that
states as well as events can be causes. Her principal argument for this is
by extension from a clear case. 70 Thomson imagines a variation of
BRICK in which C walks toward the bus-stop "precisely in order to
deflect A's brick into B's eye."' 7' Thomson argues:
(1) When C intends to deflect the brick into B's eye, "it is surely correct ...that C's walking towards the bus-stop caused the loss of
'7 2
B's eye."

(2) The intention with which C walked "surely cannot '7be3 thought to
fix whether the walking caused the loss of B's eye."
Therefore:
(3) It is [surely?] correct that C's walking toward the bus-stop caused
the loss of B's eye even when C did not intend to deflect the brick
into B's eye.
This is an odd argument, for what makes the clear case clear in (1) is
the intention of C; yet (2) denies the relevance of the intention, allowing
supra note 16, at xiii, that the glass would have shattered anyway because another was waiting to
smash it with a shoe if it was not smashed with a hammer, Thomson, supra note 1, at 482; or that the
bell's ringing would not, have occurred anyway, because another stood ready to cut the wire to the
bell. Id. at 484. I would say, with Mackie, that these are different shatterings and different silences.
just as the burning of the house in my example differs from the burning that would have occurred

had F, reached the house rather than F l . See J.L. MACKIE, supra note 18, at 44-46.
69. My "educable agnosticism" on counterfactual analyses of causation remains despite the
foregoing argument, partly because of my uncertainty whether such fine-grained individuation of
harms does not reduce the counterfactual analysis to a trivial truth; partly because of the very nondiscriminating notion of cause that such an analysis would justify (think how much is necessary for
the occurrence of any event-token in all of its particularity); and partly because such an analysis of
the counterfactuals necessary to support singular causal statements eliminates a seeming difference
between such counterfactual discourse and explicitly modal discourse. On this latter point. see THE
POSSIBLE AND THE ACTUAL 34 (M. Loux ed. 1979).

70. Thomson, supra note 1,at 484-85.
71. Id. at 485.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
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Thomson to decide the less clear case in (3). I do not see how such an
argument can convince anyone. Anyone who finds (2) plausible (as do I)
will not find (1) any more plausible than (3). And anyone who finds
(1) more plausible than (3) will not find (2) plausible. I do not think,
therefore, that there is an audience to which such an argument can appeal. It is like trying to convince someone (who is in doubt about
whether a white, sweet object is a lemon) that it is a lemon, by arguing:
"this other object, because it is a yellow fruit tart of taste, is surely a
lemon; yet surely the color and taste are not essential to an item being a
lemon; therefore, this first object, differing from the other object only in
color and taste, is also a lemon too."
Earlier in her article Thomson has the beginnings of another positive argument for why states as well as events can be causes. The argument as she states it proceeds from a single premise, namely:
(1) objects can be causes as well as events.
As Thomson puts it: "We really do not use the verb 'cause' that it can
truly be said only of events that they cause things. People cause things.
And so do bullets."' 74 From this premise about objects as causes, Thomson concludes that one of the arguments for why states cannot be
76
causes,75 is no good.

As a friendly critic, let me see how Thomson might advance this as a
positive argument for the thesis that states can be causes (and not merely
a negative argument against the thesis that states cannot be causes). Add
to Thomson's argument a second premise:
(2) The only distinction here worth defending is between events as
causes versus all other things as causes; if items other than events
can be causes, then so can states.
We might call this second premise the "crossing of the Rubicon"
premise, for it asserts that there is only one significant line to worry
about here and that once that line is crossed, one might as well go on to
sack Rome itself. Such mode of argument is reminiscent of Russell's argument for admitting qualities into our ontology as well as entities: since
we have to let relations in anyway (to be able to talk of entities), we may
77
as well let in other universals such as qualities.
Thomson articulates a reason which might incline one to accept this
74. Id. at 479.
75. The argument (against states being causes), against which Thomson is arguing, is set forth
by her in her contribution to this volume. Id. at 474-76, 478.
76. Id. at 479.
77. See the excerpt entitled The World of Universals from RUSSEtl., THE PROBLEMS Of- PHILOSOPHY (1912), reprinted in UNIVERSAIS AND PARTICULARS: READINGS IN ONTOLOGY 16-23
(M. Loux ed. 1970).
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kind of argument here. The line between events and all other things
might have some significance because of the following considerations:
causes explain changes in the world; if one believes that only change can
bring about change, 7 8 and that only events are changes, then one has
reason to find the line between events and all other things significant
when considering the question of what can be a cause.
Neither Thomson nor I believe that only changes are caused (as opposed to the persistence of stable states, for example), or that only
changes can beget change, but a friend of the "only events can be causes"
thesis might very well believe both of these things. If so, then once
Thomson establishes that objects (which are not changes) can be causes,
she has crossed her adversary's Rubicon and he may as well surrender
Rome. But has Thomson established that objects can be causes? She
adverts to the facts of usage about "causes," truthfully noting that we
certainly say things like, "Smith caused Jones' death" and "[t]hat bullet
caused Jones' death."' 79 Yet as Thomson would plainly admit (given her
realism about causation), the facts of ordinary usage are far from the last
word on what causation is. As Quine has remarked, "Many of our casual remarks.., would want dusting up when our thoughts turn seriously
ontological." 8 0
Why might we say the things Thomson imagines? One of our pragmatic rules for appropriate utterance is to say no more than is needed on
particular occasions.8 1 If someone wants to know only who by his actions caused Jones' death, or what instrumentality Smith used in killing
Jones, to say, "Smith caused Jones' death," or "The bullet caused Jones'
death" is all that needs to be said. We need take the apparent ontological
commitments to persons or objects as causes no more seriously than we
do when we say, "there is something shared by both white dogs and
white houses, namely, their whiteness. ' 82 In each case, Quine admonishes us, we should paraphrase to find our true commitments.
The paraphrase that suggests itself here is just the one Thomson
rather scornfully puts aside:8 3 "Smith caused Jones' death" is elliptical
for, "some act of Smith's (you do not need to know which one so I will
78. Thomson, supra note 1, at 475, 478.
79. Id. at 478.
80.

W.V. QUINE, ONTOLOGICA.i

81.

Grice, 1967 William James Lectures, Harvard University, published as Logic and Conversa-

RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS 100 (1969).

tion, 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS, SPEECH ACTS 41, 45-46 (P. Cole & J. Morgan eds. 1975). As
Grice puts his quantitative maxim for appropriate conversation: "Do not make your contributions
more informative than is required." Id. at 45.
82. Quine's example, in w.v. QUINE, FROM A LOGICAl POINT OF VIEW 13 (2d ed. 1961).
83. Thomson, supra note 1, at 479.
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not tell you) caused Jones' death," and "the bullet caused Jones' death"
is an ellipsis for, "some event involving the bullet caused Jones' death."
Thomson rejects these paraphrases because she finds the notion of "involving" hopelessly indeterminate:
[I]t is plainly unacceptable to say that "Smith caused Jones' death" is
elliptical for "An event in one or another way involving Smith caused
Jones' death," since every event in one or another way involves everybody. For example, Smith's shooting of Jones involves you in that it is
an event which takes place on or before or after your fourth birthday;
but you, after all, did not cause Jones' death. And I see no future in
the effort
to constrain the notion "involvement" so as to make this idea
84
work.

This answer is much too short. Thomson's demand for any precision in spelling out the meaning of "involvement" is misplaced. For if I
am correct that we say such things in speech contexts where saying more
would be inappropriate, then saying more would be inappropriate. "Involve" is used here only as a place-holder for information that, given the
context of the utterance, the listener does not need or want. Absent a
context of utterance (i.e., in the null context), 85 we can only say the word
does not mean, "any relation to Smith," no more than it means "no relation to Smith." In this indeterminacy, this usage of "involve" does not
suffer at all in comparison with the way we ordinarily use "similar:"
"similar" never means, "similar in all respects," any more than it means,
"similar in no respects;" it only means "similar in relevant respects," the
conditions of relevancy to be supplied when and if needed. 86
All of this only blunts for me any facts of usage as constituting an
argument one way or another about objects or persons as causes. Do
people and bullets cause things, in some sense not reducible to events in
which these objects are involved causing things? I am also an educable
agnostic on this question, but nothing in Thomson's article convinces me
one way or the other. 87 Her reconstructed Rubicon argument, accordingly, lacks a plausible first premise. And in default of any other argument appearing in Thomson's paper, that leaves us with the old Scottish
verdict on Thomson's attempt to disprove that states cannot be causes:
"not proven."
My concluding comment on Thomson's paper is to question
whether a restriction that allowed only events but not states as causes
84.
85.
Theory,
86.
87.

Id.
On the idea of a null context of utterance, see Katz & Fodor, The Structure of a Semantic
39 LANGUAGE 170, 174 (1963).
Cf Goodman, Seven Strictures on Similarity, PROBLEMS AND PROJECTS (1976).
Nor do her attempts at making "agent-causation" primitive for persons convince me one

way or the other. See R. TAYt.OR, ACTION AND PURPOSE (1966).
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would give causation the kind of discriminating power demanded of it by
MSRT. I think not, for such a restriction seems both under- and overinclusive. To begin with, the restriction is too restrictive in that it excludes factors that are plausibly rights-violations by defendants. Imagine
a variation of Thomson's BRICK scenario ("BANANA"?): A, a banana
vendor, notices that a banana peel has dropped off his truck; knowing
that B, whom A hates and wishes to see hurt, will be coming along
shortly, A does not pick up the peel; B slips on the peel and falls, to his
injury.
In BANANA, does not A violate B's rights? I think the answer
might be yes, for two different reasons. Thomson herself mentions one of
these: 88 A was both capable of preventing B's injury and, because it was
his peel, A was under a duty to prevent the injury by removing the peel;
A's duty is presumably the correlative of B's right, so that A's breach of
duty is a violation of B's rights. Alternatively, it might be the case that
there was some earlier act of A's (loading the truck with bananas, parking it where he did) that caused the state that caused B's fall and injury.
In which case we would hold A for violating B's rights, not by omitting
to pick up the peel, but rather by causing (through his positive actions)
B's injury.
In either alternative it seems we need to conceive of states as causes.
A's liability for omission seems to depend on the state of the peel being
where it was causing B's fall-else how would A's breach of his duty to
change that state cause B's injury? Similarly, for some earlier act of A's
(such as parking his truck) to be the cause of B's injury, seemingly the
state also must be a cause-for what the earlier act caused was a state
which (with other events and states) caused B's injury.
This underinclusiveness of the "only-events-may-be-causes" thesis
for MSRT was implicitly recognized by those who championed the thesis. Beale, for example, thought that it was only "active forces"-which
it seems fair to construe to be events but not states because the activity of
a force for Beale was external change-could be causes. Nonetheless, in
order to maintain liability in cases like BANANA, Beale had to allow
that the "condition" (state) created by a defendant could be a cause:
If, then, this condition is unstable, if it is in appreciable danger of being
acted upon by an oncoming force, the defendant who thus created a
condition in the path of an oncoming force stands in a certain causal
relation to the latter force, though the relation is worked out through
the passive line. 89
88. Thomson, supra note 1, at 494.
89. Beale, Proximate Consequences, supra note 54, at 643.
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Epstein similarly saw that he could not restrict causation to his
three paradigms involving acts (events) by a defendant (force, fright, and
compulsion); rather, to make plausible his thesis that causing another
harm is to violate that other's rights Epstein allows that conditions, too,
may be causes. 90 Like Beale before him, Epstein wants to hedge his metaphysical bets here: "The creation of a dangerous condition, without
more, does not cause harm in the narrow sense of the term. Some further
act or event of the kinds already considered must be identified before the
causal analysis is completed .... ,9 Still, Epstein too is driven to conclude that some states-the "dangerous" or "unstable" ones-can be
causes, even if only in conjunction with events.
The over-inclusiveness of the "events-only" thesis can be seen by varying Thomson's BRICK slightly: let the victim, B, be walking as well as
the bystander, C, and let the movement of each of them be necessary for
the deflection of A's brick onto B's eye. The "events-only" thesis may be
discriminating, but it does not seem to be discriminating enough: neither
B nor C violated B's rights by their walking, but their walking is equally
a cause with A's throwing the brick under the "events-only" thesis.
So even if the "events-only" thesis were true, it seems a poor candidate to do the discriminating work demanded of it by MSRT. Are there
any other restrictive analyses of causation that are themselves plausible
enough to make MSRT plausible? There are, so far as I know, only four
possibilities, and I shall close by mentioning each briefly.
One might attempt to refine the Beale/Epstein paradigms so that the
concept of causation that emerges better fits the demands of MSRT. Yet
this is to work backwards, gerrymandering the concept of causation just
so that it will fit the needs of MSRT (even though I would guess that that
is pretty much the way Epstein arrived at his four "paradigms" of causation). We need an independent analysis of what "cause" means and what
causation is that does not assume from the start that it has to fit some
moral thesis. There is nothing in Epstein's method that would give us
any reason to think his paradigms give either the meaning of "cause" or
describe the essence of the relation: such paradigms are partial descriptions of a few traditional legal causes of action (battery/trespass/assault/
negligence/nuisance), not even an attempt at an analysis of the causal
relation that exists quite independently of the law but on which the law is
built.
Hart and Honor6's justly celebrated theses about what is, and what
90. Epstein, supra note 2, at 177-87.
91. Id. at 177.
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is not, a direct cause, have more promise as an analysis of what causation
is, but they too, as Thomson recognizes, 92 ultimately fail to focus on the
metaphysical or the semantic questions about causation. As they them93
selves recognize in their recently reissued edition of their fine book,
their analysis is of the usage, in ordinary language, of "cause." They
thus distinguish two different contexts of use, explanatory and attributive, and extract a concept (or concepts) of causation accordingly. This
focus on the conditions in which the word "cause" is appropriately uttered ensures that their analysis is, as Thomson puts it, "pragmatic" and
94
not "ontological."
While I agree with Thomson's pragmatic interpretation of Hart and
Honor6's causally discriminating principles, it would not be difficult to
construct a metaphysical version. 95 In this version, there are two kinds
of uncaused causes in the universe, free human actions and those natural
events that are (given the circumstances in which they occur) "just a
coincidence." On this gappy metaphysical view, we do not select one of
these two events as "the cause" of some other event because of pragmatic
factors like explanatory relevance or the interests of the audience; rather,
in this version we rightly gravitate to these two features because they are
the only features that are the ultimate cause of anything. Put another
way, they are the beginnings of all causal chains, so they are rightly emphasized over any other subsequent links in the chain when we engage in
attributive, explanatory or any other tasks involving "cause."
A third approach is to take causation to be an unanalyzable primitive, and then to say that it is a relation that nonetheless admits of degrees. "Cause" can be used to analyze other concepts, but no other
concept can be used to analyze it; and the causal relation can be a moreor-less affair, so that one event can be "more of a cause" of some harm
than another event. Both of these views can fairly be attributed to Jeremiah Smith, whose highly influential series of articles in the 1911
HarvardLaw Review concluded that all that may or need be said about
causation to juries was whether or not defendant's action was a "substan'9 6
tial factor in producing the damage complained of."
92. Thomson, supra note 1, at 472-73.
93. H.L.A. HART & T. HONORI, supra note 16, at xxxiii-xxxiv.
94. Thomson, supra note 1, at 473.
95. Sanford Kadish gives Hart and Honor6 such a metaphysical reading with respect to one of
their two criteria for intervening and ultimate causes, free human action. See Kadish, Complicity,
Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretationof Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (1985).
96. Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. REV. 103, 223, 253, 303 (1911). Both
of Smith's metaphysical presuppositions find echoes in more contemporary literature. Thus, in philosophy Richard Boyd urges that we should take "cause" as primitive and give up the fruitless quest
for its analysis. Boyd, Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail, in

THOMSON'S PRELIMINARIES

Give Smith the two metaphysical assumptions above and his proposal is not nearly as vacuous as it has been thought to be by most subsequent scholars. If "cause" is a primitive notion, then no test or definition
need be attempted, as Smith himself argued. 9 7 If causation is a more-orless affair, then one does need to specify how much of it is a prerequisite
for liability, and Smith's answer was, "a substantial amount." Although
"substantial" is vague, its vagueness may be a virtue if degrees of causation vary on a smooth continuum; precise stipulations are notoriously
arbitrary when we seek to divide bald from not-bald, old from middleaged. Moreover, notice how discriminating Smith's view could make
causation: if there is a large size threshold for what counts as cause, then
only a few of the many events or states necessary for the production of a
harm are its causes. It might even turn out that all and only those acts
that are "large causes" are plausibly thought to be rights-violating actsthe discriminating notion of cause sought by the friends of MSRT.
As a last possibility, consider what I shall awkwardly call the
Becht/Miller/Keeton/Wright view of causation. 98 Keeton's example 99
is helpful in elucidating this view. Suppose a defendant places unlabelled
rat poison near a stove; because the stove was in the kitchen, the defendant's act also had the property of placing the rat poison near the food.
The heat from the stove causes the rat poison to explode, injuring the
plaintiff. If we ask whether the defendant's act of placing the rat poison
where he did caused the plaintiff's injury, the answer is, "yes." But if we
ask whether various properties of the defendant's action caused the plaintiff's injury, we can be more discriminating: that the rat poison was near
the food was causally irrelevant, but that it was near to the stove was not.
To narrow the class of things that can be causes the Becht/Miller/
Keeton/Wright view must defend two theses: first, a metaphysical thesis
that only properties of event-tokens may be causes and that the eventtokens themselves may not be causes; and second, a moral thesis that, in
order to determine whether an actor is responsible for a harm, we ask the
(N. Block ed. 1980). Richard Wright discusses a
number of legal theorists similarly inclined. Wright, supra note 42, at 1784-88. With regard to
Smith's second presupposition, product liability torts have given rise to renewals of the idea that we
should apportion liability, not with respect to fault, but with respect to degrees of causal contribution to an indivisible injury. This mode of joint liability/contribution presupposes, with Smith, that
causation is a more-or-less affair that admits of degrees. See, e.g., Rizzo & Arnold, supra note 5, at
1402-03.
97. Smith, supra note 96, at 305-08.
98. Their views can be found, respectively, in: A. BECHT & F. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACREADINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

TUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES (1961);
CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1963); Wright, supra note 42.

99. R.

KEETON,

supra note 98, at 3.
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causal question only with respect to those properties of his act-tokens
that are relevant to his culpability. What this second thesis means with
respect to the negligent actor who placed the rat poison in the kitchen,
for example, is that we ask whether the property of his act that made it
negligent (the placing near the food, assuming arguendo that was the
only significant risk) caused the harm; and we get a determinate answer,
namely, this property did not cause the harm and therefore this actor is
not responsible for the harm (even though another property of his act did
cause the harm). 0 0
This view of the range of objects that can be causes in attributive
contexts is highly discriminating in these contexts. In Thomson's
BRICK scenario, for example, only A's action has a property that is
causally relevant to B's harm in attributive contexts, because only that
property was relevant to someone's culpability. Much of the discriminating power of this view of cause, of course, stems from its moral thesis
about how one picks properties about which to ask the causal question; it
is thus difficult to characterize this view as a purely metaphysical view
about causation answering to the needs of MSRT.
Each of these four analyses of causation hold out some promise of
providing the discriminating idea of causation needed by a friend of
MSRT. Yet each also has serious, perhaps crippling, problems: Epstein's "paradigms" are not the kind of paradigmatic examples that some
ordinary language philosophers, at one time at least, thought could give
the meaning of a word such as "causes,"' 0 1 and even if they were, the
"paradigm case argument," as a mode of meaning analysis, is pretty
much dead, and for good reason; 0 2 Hart and Honor6's analysis is either
only pragmatic, or, if taken metaphysically, requires a gappy view of determinism that is an anathema to those of us with more smoothly determinist world views; Smith's big-versus-little-cause discriminations not
only require us to take causation to be primitive-always a problem in
non-foundationalist theories of knowledge-but even worse, requires us
0 3
to believe causation is a scalar phenomenon that admits of degrees;
100. For actors whose culpability is not negligence, but is intentionality or strict liability, this
second thesis has to be worked out separately. See id. at 100-17; Wright, supra note 42, at 1769-71.
101. John Borgo has some fun with Epstein's misuse of the paradigm case argument in Borgo,
Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 427-32 (1979).
102. See Moore, supra note 31, at 281-92, for a discussion of the paradigm case argument and its
limitations.
103. It is important that this metaphysical question not be made to appear to be easier than it is.
Of course, different types of events have higher and lower probabilities for bringing about certain
other types of events, so that if one confuses probability theory with the causal relation between
event-tokens, as do Rizzo & Arnold, supra note 5, then there will appear to be nothing difficult about
conceiving causation to be a scalar phenomenon. Rizzo and Arnold attempt to justify their slide
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and finally, the Becht/Miller/Keeton/Wright view relies on the questionable metaphysical view that a universal (a property) can be a cause in
04
lieu of the act-token itself being a cause.1
My own prognosis is that the prospects for discovering the kind of
discriminating view of causation required by MSRT are bleak. Causation may well be just too promiscuous a relation to play this large a role
in our moral life. One point on which Thomson's paper and my own
would fully agree, however, is the need for those interested in the question, lawyers included, to do the metaphysics without which it cannot be
answered. The time is long past (if indeed ever it was appropriate) to say
that "the lawyer cannot afford to adventure himself with philosophers in
the logical and metaphysical controversises that beset the idea of
cause."' 0 5 Lawyers can ill-afford not to so adventure themselves, and
those who repeat these oft-quoted words usually do so to excuse an inexcusable ignorance.

identify causal relationships it is necessary to
from probability to causation by observing that "[t]o
know something about the typical relations between events." Rizzo & Arnold, supra note 5, at 1409
n.54. Fair enough, but their conclusion does not follow. Epistemology (how we know something) is
not metaphysics (what there is). My earlier skepticism about degrees of causation is in Moore,
Causation and the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1091, 1114-18 (1985).
104. For a sophisticated defense of this view, see J.L. MACKIE, supra note 18, at ch. 10.
Although Mackie seemed to think that there were two kinds of causes-whole event-tokens, and
properties of event-tokens-a close reading reveals that Mackie regarded only properties as causes,
event-tokens being relegated to common sense notions of "cause" but not to causation itself.
105.

POLLACK, TORTS 36 (6th ed. 1901).

